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A STATUTORY APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW 
KEVIN C. McMUNIGAL* 
A few years ago at an AALS hiring conference, several colleagues and I 
interviewed a bright, well-qualified faculty candidate interested in teaching 
Criminal Law.  During the interview, he told us he wanted to teach Criminal 
Law because it was a common law course and he was interested in how judges 
shape legal rules through the common law process. 
Criminal Law, though, has not been a true common law subject for many 
years.  The Supreme Court, for example, announced almost 200 years ago that 
there are no federal common law crimes.1  As a result of the nineteenth century 
codification movement, every American state has for decades accepted the 
notion of legislative supremacy in Criminal Law—the idea that legislators 
rather than judges should create and define criminal offenses.  How could a 
recent graduate of a top law school have missed this point in his Criminal Law 
course? 
Quite understandably it turns out.  This young man’s conception of 
Criminal Law arose in all likelihood not from some peculiar lack of 
perceptiveness on his part.  Instead, his attitude was a predictable product of 
current teaching methodology.  Despite the fact that statutory rather than 
common law crimes have long been the norm in this country, legislators and 
statutes receive scant attention in modern Criminal Law casebooks and 
classrooms.  Legality, legislative supremacy, and the demise of common law 
crimes make a brief appearance in the first act of the typical Criminal Law 
course, but then judges and their opinions take center stage for the rest of the 
semester.  As the word casebook announces, judicial opinions are the primary 
vehicles used to teach the substance of Criminal Law.  Casebooks spotlight the 
judge as lawmaker and leave the legislator lurking in the shadows.  A first year 
Criminal Law casebook, for example, is usually indistinguishable from 
casebooks in subjects where judges are the primary lawmakers through a 
common law process, such as Torts, Contracts, and Property.  It is little 
wonder, then, that the young man I interviewed thought of Criminal Law as a 
common law course.  In most law schools, Criminal Law, along with Torts, 
 
* Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
 1. See United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); United 
States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415, 416-17 (1816). 
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Contracts, and Property are still treated as courses that “teach the substance, 
and the methodology, of the common law.”2 
In order to give students a more current and accurate view of criminal law 
as a statutory field, I recommend the incorporation of a statutory approach.  
My suggestion is not to replace cases entirely.  Cases are wonderful teaching 
tools, allowing students to see the criminal law applied to concrete and often 
compelling factual scenarios and to gain insight into the policies behind the 
law from the rationales provided for deciding cases.  Analyzing cases is a 
crucial skill for students to master. 
But it makes sense today to balance the traditional use of judicial opinions 
by giving equal time and attention to statutes.  Combining augmented use of 
statutes with problems and other exercises requires students to work directly 
with the text of statutes to grasp the substance of Criminal Law.  The starting 
point for analysis in any criminal case is typically the statute under which the 
defendant was charged.  So students currently encounter statutes in reading 
cases, but they do so in a relatively passive way—reading how a judge 
analyzes or interprets a particular statute.  A statutory approach casts students 
in an active role, requiring them to analyze and interpret statutes without 
guidance from a judicial opinion.  It fosters in students an appreciation of 
judicial opinions as exercises in interpretation rather than law creation.  
Blending a statutory approach with customary case-oriented methodology also 
fosters greater exploration of the roles the various branches of government play 
in shaping the criminal law than use of cases alone. 
There are a number of reasons to incorporate a statutory approach into 
teaching Criminal Law.  One is that a statutory approach conveys to students 
the reality of the importance of statutes in the modern legal world, including 
criminal law.  A second reason is that use of statutes better prepares students 
for the practice of law by giving them confidence and analytical skills in 
dealing with statutes, skills that will be vital to them regardless of the subject 
matter or locale of their practice.  A third reason is that incorporating a 
statutory approach can make the course more engaging.  It prompts students to 
confront some of the central issues in criminal law today, such as the roles 
played by the various branches of government in shaping the substantive 
criminal law.  It facilitates students joining current debates about the proper 
method judges should use in interpreting legal text, whether the language is 
part of a statute, a rule of evidence, an administrative regulation, or a clause in 
a constitution.  Finally, using statutes has pragmatic advantages.  A criminal 
 
 2. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 3 (1997)(“The overwhelming majority of the courses taught in that first year 
[of law school], and surely the ones that have the most profound effect, teach the substance, and 
the methodology, of the common law – torts, for example; contracts; property; criminal law.”). 
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statute is often relatively compact in comparison to a judicial opinion.  As a 
consequence, one can bring four or five statutes representing an array of policy 
approaches to a particular criminal law issue to the students’ attention in one or 
two pages.  Covering a similar range of viewpoints through cases requires 
more space and time.  For the same reason, a statute also lends itself to student 
drafting exercises more easily than does a judicial opinion. 
In the following pages, I discuss each of these rationales in more detail and 
provide examples of how to incorporate a statutory approach. 
I.  THE IMPORTANCE OF STATUTES IN THE MODERN LEGAL WORLD 
Over-reliance on cases does students a disservice because it fails to give 
them an accurate view of the importance of statutes in criminal law today.  
Many states and the federal government have abolished common law crimes 
entirely.  Some states retain common law crimes as long as the legislature has 
not enacted a statute on the subject.3  Though such statutes give judges in some 
states the theoretical power to create new crimes, that power is rarely used.4 
Professor Wayne LaFave’s hornbook gives examples of new crimes created by 
judges in states retaining common law crimes.5  Almost all are from the 
nineteenth century or early decades of the twentieth century.  Recently, while 
working on a new first-year Criminal Law text,6 I was looking for judicial 
opinions that would allow students to juxtapose cases with opposing points of 
view on common law crimes and would prompt students to think about the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of judges and legislators as lawmakers.  The 
selection of cases from within American jurisdictions in which a court created 
a new offense were so meager and dated, that I decided to use a relatively 
recent Scottish case to demonstrate the common law approach to creating and 
defining crimes.  In that case, a man was convicted and sentenced to prison for 
selling glue-sniffing materials to children, despite a prior legislative decision 
not to criminalize such behavior.7 
The dominant attitude expressed in American jurisdictions is one of 
legislative supremacy and exclusivity.  This modern notion is reflected in the 
following passage from a Florida Supreme Court opinion reversing a woman’s 
controversial drug distribution conviction for exposing the fetus she was 
carrying to cocaine: 
 
 3. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-3 (Michie 1978), Construction of Criminal Code (“In 
criminal cases where no provision of this code is applicable, the common law, as recognized by 
the United States and the several states of the Union, shall govern.”). 
 4. A relatively recent exception is People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 739 
(1994)(recognizing assisting suicide as a common law offense). 
 5. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, 78-83 (4th ed. 2003). 
 6. Kate E. Bloch & Kevin C. McMunigal, CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 
(forthcoming Aspen 2004). 
 7. See Khaliq v. Her Majesty’s Advocate, 1984 SCCR 23 (17 November, 1983). 
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Neither judges nor prosecutors can make criminal laws.  This is the purview of 
the Legislature.  If the Legislature wanted to punish the uterine transfer of 
cocaine from a mother to her fetus, it would be up to the Legislature to 
consider the attending public policy and constitutional arguments and then pass 
its Legislation.  The Legislature has not done so and the court has no power to 
make such a law.8 
In failing to approach Criminal Law as a statutory course, teachers fail to 
recognize the reality of the importance of statutes both in criminal law and 
other fields of law. 
The common law of crimes cannot and should not be banished from the 
Criminal Law classroom any more than judicial opinions should be.  But it 
should be viewed as the historical backdrop to today’s statutory offenses and a 
significant resource in statutory interpretation, helping define terms and 
providing context for deciphering legislative intent.  At times, a legislature 
enacts a statute with the intent of simply codifying the common law.  At other 
times, it uses terms borrowed from the common law without defining those 
terms.  In either case, the courts must draw on the common law to make sense 
of the statute and act in accordance with legislative intent.  A statutory 
approach helps students see the common law of crimes as a resource used in 
drafting and interpreting criminal statutes, rather than the current source of 
criminal law. 
Criminal law is not alone as a field in which statutory law dominates.  
Rather, it is typical of what students will encounter in the vast majority of areas 
of practice. Consider, for example, the following descriptions of the 
importance of statutes.  Each reflects the modern legal reality that prompted 
Judge Guido Calabresi more than twenty years ago to label the age in which 
modern lawyers work an “age of statutes.”9 
We live in an age of statutes in which the nation’s legislatures serve actively as 
the dominant institutions for determining public policy and translating it into 
law.10 
We live in an age of legislation, and most new law is statutory law.11 
Statutory interpretation is what most lawyers do for a good deal of their time.  
Today, the boundaries of most legal inquiry are structured by statutes and 
administrative regulations, not the common law.12 
 
 8. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1294 (Fla. 1992) (quoting People v. Bremer, No. 90-
32227-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991)). 
 9. Guido Calabresi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
 10. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS xv (1997). 
 11. SCALIA, supra note 2, at 13. 
 12. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 2 
(2000). 
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The recent trend toward legal globalization provides another reason to 
expose students to statutes as well as cases.13  Due to the tightening of the 
international economic, political, and social fabric, lawyers today are much 
more likely than those who graduated even twenty or thirty years ago to 
engage with legal cultures based in the civil law tradition in which codes rather 
than judicial opinions are the primary source of law. 
Law school curricula do not adequately prepare students for a legal world 
in which statutes play such an important role.  The first-year curriculum in 
particular, with its heavy reliance on common law courses, fails to give 
students a solid grounding in statutory analysis at a point in their legal 
education when they are most open to learning legal methods and analysis. 
Criminal Law is an ideal place to remedy this failure. 
II.  TEACHING STATUTORY ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
Most of the students we teach in Criminal Law will not practice criminal 
law.  What then do we want them to take from the course?  One of the things a 
statutory approach gives students is a set of skills in analyzing, interpreting and 
drafting statutes, skills that will be useful in virtually every area of modern law 
practice.  Due to the dominance of common law courses in the first-year 
curriculum, they are unlikely to obtain these skills elsewhere during their first 
year. 
The typical starting point for any criminal prosecution is a statute.  Often, 
though, teachers and students are hard-pressed to find the complete text of that 
statute in first-year Criminal Law casebooks.  Sometimes the judge who wrote 
the opinion chose not to include the text of the applicable statute.  At other 
times, the casebook’s authors removed the statutory text in editing an opinion. 
When the text of a statute is provided, it often appears in the fine print of a 
footnote.  This restricted access sends the message that the text of a statute is 
of little if any importance.  The judicial opinion is the main event in terms of 
classroom time, preparation, and analysis. 
If one relies exclusively on cases, students never confront, as they will in 
practice, a set of facts and the bare text of a rule or statute.  Under the case 
method, students become acclimated to having a judge as a tour guide to a 
statute.  The professor often asks a student after reading a case to evaluate the 
judge’s analysis of a statute rather than to analyze it herself.  The students are 
cast as observers of rather than participants in the analytical and interpretive 
process.  The case method trains students to look not to a statute’s language to 
discern its meaning, but to the collection of annotated cases that typically 
follows statutes in published codes. 
 
 13. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using the Evidence Course as a Vehicle for Teaching 
Legisprudential Skills, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 907, 908 (2003). 
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A statutory approach casts the students in an active role.  It has them read 
lots of criminal statutes and uses questions and problems to force them to 
grapple with and derive the substance of the criminal law from those statutes. 
Two types of exercises that help students develop confidence and skills 
regarding statutes are statutory interpretation and drafting exercises. 
A. Statutory Interpretation Problems 
Traditional treatment of the conduct component of crime focuses on issues 
such as voluntariness, omission, and status.  Each is a useful vehicle for 
probing the purposes and boundaries of criminal liability.  Rarely investigated, 
though, is the task of determining what conduct falls within a particular 
statute’s language.  Here is an example of a statutory interpretation exercise I 
































You are a justice of a state supreme court. You and the other justices have 
agreed to review a series of cases raising questions about the scope of the 
following criminal statute: 
 
Driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
No person shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, 
or trackless trolley within this state if the 
person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug 
of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse. 
 
The facts in the cases are as follows: 
 
Case 1. At 1:30 a.m. in the middle of a cold and snowy January night, the 
sound of a car motor running in his driveway awoke Timothy. When he 
investigated, he found that a stranger, Allen, had parked his car in Timothy’s 
driveway with the motor running. Allen was asleep in the driver’s seat and 
did not awake or stir when Timothy shone a flashlight through the car 
window into his face. Timothy called the police. The arresting officer 
concluded that Allen had been in Timothy’s driveway a considerable time 
since no tire tracks were visible behind Allen’s car in the freshly fallen snow.  
 
Case 2. After ending a fifteen hour work shift at 10 p.m., Elaine drove to 
McDuffie’s Bar, parked her car and went inside where she stayed until the 
bar closed at 2:30 a.m. Police found Elaine passed out and slumped over the 
steering wheel of her car, which was still in the same space in McDuffie’s lot    
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B. Statutory Drafting Exercises 
A great way to teach students statutory analysis and sensitize them to 
drafting and interpretation issues is to have them draft a few statutes.  Early in 
the semester, after my class has read Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador 
County,14 I give my students the drafting exercise that appears below.  In 
Keeler, the California Supreme Court found that the conduct of a husband who 
assaulted his wife with the purpose of killing the fetus she was carrying did not 
fall within the California homicide statute.15 The students usually feel that the 
defendant’s actions should be subject to criminal sanction, so I ask them to put 
themselves in the position of the California legislature immediately after the 











 14. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). 
 15. Id. at 639. 
where she had parked it at 10 p.m. The motor was running at high speed and 
Elaine’s foot was on the accelerator. The car was not in gear and the 
emergency brake was engaged. Elaine admitted to the arresting police 
officers that she was intoxicated and told them she had decided to follow her 
lawyer’s advice not to drive if she “had more than two beers.” 
 
Case 3. Police found Bradley asleep in the driver’s seat of his car.  The car 
was parked in a lot belonging to a county park.  Its motor was not running, 
but its radio was on.  The key was in the ignition, but turned to the left or 
“ACC” position.   The key needs to be turned in the opposite direction, to the 
right, to start the engine. 
 
Allen, Elaine, and Bradley were each charged with violating the above 
statute. The lower courts have disagreed on whether or not Allen, Elaine, and 
Bradley fall within the statute. How would you rule in each case?  Assume 
that the prosecutor can prove that each defendant was under the influence of 
alcohol at the time he entered his car. 
 
Problem: Drafting a Feticide Statute 
 
You are the legislative assistant to a member of the California legislature 
who, after reading the Keeler case, wants to enact legislation making feticide 
a crime.  She asks you to draft a criminal statute that would make Keeler's 
actions a crime.  In drafting the statute, she asks you also to consider how to 
address the following: 
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This exercise comes early in the semester and the students’ statutes vary in 
quality.  But it helps them to understand that a legislator needs to anticipate a 
statute being applied to a wide variety of factual scenarios.  The students have 
to decide how they want to resolve each of the fact patterns presented in the 
exercise as a matter of criminal justice policy.  Then, they need to choose 
language that gives effect to those decisions. 
In drafting these feticide statutes, first-year students encounter many of the 
same problems legislators confront in drafting real statutes.  For example, their 
statutes are often quite imprecise about mental state in terms of (1) what level 
of mental state is required for conviction and (2) to what non-mental 
element(s) the mental state relates.  As in homicide, the key mental state in 
feticide is usually the one regarding the death of the fetus.  The students often 
write their statutes so that whatever mental state they have chosen appears to 
apply to the conduct element and the mental state regarding death is unclear. 
Students also often bootleg mental state language from some other statute, 
often a homicide statute, into their feticide statutes without knowing precisely 
(or even vaguely) what it means. 
I usually pick a handful of the students’ feticide statutes and project them 
on a Smartboard in class.  One could just as easily photocopy them onto 
transparencies and show them with an overhead projector.  We focus on how 
word choice in a statute reflects underlying decisions about criminal policy and 
affects the outcomes of cases.  The students’ feticide statutes are a great tool to 
use later in the semester when covering the mental state component of crime. 
As stated previously, the students’ own work illustrates problems legislatures 
and judges struggle with in drafting and interpreting statutory language 
regarding mental state.  This drafting exercise allows students to use mistakes 
as learning opportunities and to appreciate what it takes to draft clear 
legislation.  As the students gain analytic and drafting skills during the 
semester, they are often able to redraft their feticide statutes to remedy 
ambiguities, giving them a genuine sense of accomplishment when they 
produce a statute clearer than many produced by legislatures. 
(a) a medical doctor performing an abortion; 
 
(b) a driver who causes an auto accident resulting in a pregnant woman losing the 
fetus she is carrying; 
 
(c) a pregnant woman whose fetus dies because she abused cocaine during the 
pregnancy.  
 
Should the actors in these three situations be included or excluded from the crime 
of feticide? Write your statute so that it reflects your answers to the previous 
question. 
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III.  ADDING NEW DIMENSIONS TO A CRIMINAL LAW COURSE 
A balanced use of statutes and cases facilitates adding dimensions to a 
Criminal Law course that are often left unexamined.  Two I will discuss here 
are (1) comparative analysis of the branches of our state and federal 
governments as makers of criminal law and (2) methods of statutory 
interpretation. 
A. Who Should Create and Define Crimes? 
Primary focal points in any Criminal Law course are the policy choices 
that shape the contours and boundaries of criminal liability.  Who should make 
those choices for our society?  In other words, who should create and define 
crimes?  The statutory approach I suggest has students closely examine the 
competence of each of the three branches of government as lawmakers.  The 
question of who should act as lawmaker arises in virtually every law school 
course, but it is often left unexplored.  Evidence books and courses, for 
example, are so absorbed with what the law of evidence is and should be they 
typically give little attention to the question of who should make evidence law, 
despite the fact that the transformation of American evidence law from 
common law to written rules is a relatively recent phenomenon of the late 
twentieth century. 
What, for example, justifies the modern preference for legislative 
supremacy in criminal law?  Are the arguments valid?  Why are we reluctant to 
accept judges as lawmakers in criminal law, when we allow them to act as 
lawmakers in areas such as torts and contracts?  What are the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of statutory and common law? Which makes 
law more accessible to the public? Which has greater legitimacy in the eyes of 
the public? Are judges or legislators most likely to keep the law in touch with 
the current needs of society? 
In my Criminal Law class, we address these questions at length at the 
outset of the semester and return to them throughout the semester.  Once 
students are sensitized to these issues, they naturally raise them in class.  And 
the students’ thinking about them often changes and becomes more insightful 
and sophisticated as they see for themselves the virtues and vices of the 
criminal statutes legislatures produce and the judicial opinions judges produce. 
B. Who Does Create and Define Crimes? 
Another interesting question a statutory approach facilitates addressing 
throughout the semester is who actually does create and define crimes?  
Despite the acceptance of the ideal of legislative supremacy in the United 
States, students discover as they proceed through their Criminal Law course 
that the distribution of power in regard to criminal lawmaking is considerably 
more complex and nuanced than the notion of legislative supremacy indicates 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1294 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1285 
and that all three branches of government exercise power in shaping criminal 
law. 
When a legislature enacts a vague statute, for example, it functions as an 
implicit grant of power to both executive branch officials and judges to 
participate in defining crimes.  Judges retain an important role as lawmakers 
under the legislative supremacy model by interpreting statutes and by setting 
limits on statutes through enforcement of constitutional provisions.  In 
addition, there are some areas of criminal law, such as defenses, which the 
judges of many jurisdictions continue to control through a common law 
process. 
C. Methods of Statutory Interpretation 
Due to the demise of common law crimes, the typical prosecution students 
read about in a criminal law casebook starts with a statute as the primary 
reference point in defining the applicable law.  So students encounter statutory 
interpretation in virtually every case.  But seldom does the judge explicitly 
articulate the choices and values that lie behind the choice of interpretative 
method.  Similarly, in most Criminal Law courses, interpretative method is not 
examined in any systematic way and statutory interpretation is not a focus for 
class attention. The thinking tends to be that explicit consideration of 
interpretative method should be restricted to courses in Legislation or perhaps 
Constitutional Law.  At best, the student ends a semester of Criminal Law with 
a modest and motley assortment of interpretative aids, such as the rule of lenity 
and using common law as a means of discerning legislative intent. 
In the early weeks of the semester, I introduce students to three schools of 
interpretation—textualism, intentionalism, and dynamic statutory 
interpretation16—and discuss arguments for and against each method. 
Variations of intentionalist interpretation are the norm in criminal cases.  Our 
discussions of textualism and dynamic statutory interpretation provide a 
context for understanding and critically evaluating intentionalism.  Discussion 
of textualism and dynamic statutory interpretation also reinforce the 
importance of paying close attention to the text of a statute because all three of 
these methods of interpretation make use of the statute’s text. 
Introducing methods of interpretation early in the course and early in a 
student’s legal education is valuable.  It allows students to understand and 
participate in a significant current controversy in law.  Because that 
controversy revolves in large part around the issue of how much power judges 
should exercise, discussion of interpretative methods integrates nicely with the 
question of who should create and define criminal offenses.  Familiarity with 
 
 16. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 
(1987). 
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these various methods also encourages students to think critically about the 
statutory interpretation they encounter in the cases they read. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
I hope this essay will convince some Criminal Law teachers to seriously 
consider incorporating a statutory approach into their Criminal Law courses.  
By blending statutes with cases, they can give their students a more accurate 
and useful view of criminal law, provide statutory skills, and make their 
courses more relevant and engaging.  The statutory approach redresses the lack 
of attention given to statutes in the first-year curriculum and provides students 
with an early foundation upon which to build throughout their law school 
careers. 
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